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Rape is one of the most heinous and degrading crimes that exist. It attacks the victim’s 
sense of human dignity and self-worth. Some argue that the crime of rape is akin to that of 
torture. The issue of rape is one that is experienced around the world; however, South Africa 
is one of the highest countries affected. 
This paper argues that South Africa is in contravention of its international obligations 
under the United Nations Convention Against Torture, and the Convention on the Elimination 
of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, specifically with regards to the crime of rape 
and its relation to the crime of torture.  
This paper aims to prove the above statement through, first establishing a link between 
the crimes of rape and torture and that that this link is applicable in both international law and 
South African law. This paper will proceed to show that there are obligations, stemming from 
both international and domestic laws, on South Africa to take positive steps in preventing the 
crime of rape among private persons. This paper will demonstrate that through failing its 
obligation of due diligence in this regard, the state of South Africa fails to comply with the 
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1. CHAPTER 1 
 
‘…Rape remains a phenomenon in respect of which all legal systems appear to be 
incompetent. We are [all] still searching for legal strategies to deal with rape.’ 
- Clare McGlynn1 
The right to bodily integrity is among the most fundamental rights afforded to human 
beings.2 The right entails that each person is entitled to ‘freedom of movement, security against 
violence, sexual satisfaction and reproductive choice’.3 When a victim suffers sexual assault, 
however, this fundamental right is deeply infringed.  
One of the most heinous and torturous forms of sexual assault is rape. The victims thereof, 
more often than not being women, not only suffer trauma from the ordeal, but must also cope 
with the social stigma that surrounds the crime of rape, the possibility of having unwillingly 
contracted a sexually transmitted disease, HIV, or falling pregnant, among other things.4 
Law surrounding the crime of sexual assault, specifically regarding those aimed at the 
prevention and punishment of rape, has evolved tremendously worldwide over the last few 
decades.5 Despite this progression, however, there are still many states throughout the 
international community in which reality is different from what is written in their legislation; 
one in which progressive laws against rape exist but have not had a substantial impact on the 
reduction of the amount of rape incidents itself.6 This may be due to a number of reasons, 
ranging from the attitude society has toward rape, resulting in women not reporting the crime, 
to the inability of the authorities to find and prosecute offenders, to the poor implementation 
of punishment against the crime of rape by the authorities.7 Perhaps it may even be due to the 
laws and punishments surrounding the crime of rape not being severe enough.  
 
1 C McGlynn ‘Rape as “Torture”? Catherine MacKinnon and Questions of Feminist Strategy’ (2008) 16 Feminist 
Legal Studies 71 at 72.  
2 Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); from here, this agreement will be referenced in 
text as ‘the UDHR’. 
3 M Patosalmi ‘Bodily Integrity and Conceptions of Subjectivity’ (2009) 38 Case Western Reserve Journal of 
International Law 225. 
4 J Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 4 ed (2014) at 595. 
5 M Ellis ‘Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime’ (2007) 38 Case Western Reserve Journal of 
International Law 225 at 246. 
6 R Bachman and R Paternoster ‘A Contemporary Look at the Effects of Rape Law Reform: How Far have we 
Really Come’ (1993) 84 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 553 at 574. 
7 Bachman op cit (n 6) at 168. 
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The crime of rape may be conducted in both the public and the private spheres. When it 
takes place in the private sphere – that is between private individuals – the act is considered as 
a severe offence. However, in international law, when carried out in the public sphere – that is, 
inflicted by, at the instigation of, or with the consent of a public official – the act of rape may 
potentially be considered as a form of torture, a crime punishable separately from rape.8 It can 
be argued that the added element of torture in the crime of rape adds a certain weight in terms 
of the severity of and the punishments that should be afforded to perpetrators of the heinous 
act. 
South Africa experiences one of the largest amounts of rape incidences in the world; 
approximately 41 500 rapes were reported in South Africa between 2018 and 2019;9 this 
number has increased by approximately 1 000 from the previous year.10 When the unreported 
incidences are taking into account, this amount is far higher. The crime of rape is an 
infringement of Section 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa which provides 
for the right to freedom and security of the person.11 In particular, Section 12 (1) (c) addresses 
one’s right to be free of all forms of violence from either public or private sources.12 
The Constitution provides further, under Section 7 (2), that the state has an obligation to 
‘respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bills of Rights’.13 This means that when 
the state fails to protect people from infringements to their rights under Section 12, it fails in 
its Constitutional duty.14 In addition to its Constitutional infringement, it may be argued that 
by failing to protect its people, the state is also in violation of South Africa’s international 
obligations under binding international treaties.   
This thesis will put forward the argument that by failing to protect its people against rape 
and other sexual assault, the state is in violation of its obligations under international law, and 
 
8 The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment General 
Comment No. 2: Implementation of Article 2 by State Parties (2008) at para 18; from here, this document will 
be referred to in text as ‘General Comment 2’. 
9 SAPS ‘Annual Crime Report 2018/ 2019: Addendum to the SAPS Annual Report’ South African Police Service, 
2018, available at https://www.saps.gov.za/services/april_to_march2018_19_presentation.pdf, accessed on 6 
January 2020.  
10 SAPS ‘Annual Crime Report 2017/ 2018: Addendum to the SAPS Annual Report’ South African Police Service,  
2018, available at  https://www.saps.gov.za/services/annual_crime_report2019.pdf, accessed on 19 June 
2019. 
11 Section 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; from here, this document will be 
referred to in text as ‘the Constitution’. 
12 Section 12 (c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
13 Section 7 (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
14 P de Vos and W Freedman South African Constitutional Law in Context (2014) at 632. 
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more specifically, the United Nations’ Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,15 as well as the Convention on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women,16 among other international human rights 
agreements. In particular, this thesis will explore the possibility of rape that is perpetrated by 
private actors being considered as a form of torture; as such, a failure of the state to intervene 
in this regard would constitute a violation of the Torture Convention as well.   
 
1.1.OBJECTIVE FOR THE RESEARCH 
 
This paper, firstly, aims to determine how severely the crime of rape is considered in 
international and African regional law, as well as to examine the relationship between the 
crimes of rape and torture in those spheres. In addition, this paper aims to determine whether 
international law places a legal obligation on the South African state to practice due diligence 
and take positive steps in reducing and preventing the crime of rape among private persons. 
Lastly, this paper seeks to determine whether South Africa is in breach of its international 
obligations with regards to practicing due diligence and taking positive steps in reducing and 
preventing the crime of rape from taking place within the country.  
As mentioned above, the crime of rape, more often than not, involves the male 
perpetrator(s) and the female victim(s). It is for this reason and for the purposes of this paper, 




1.2.1. What are the definitions and elements of the crimes of rape and torture in South 
African law? 
1.2.2. Does international and African regional law consider rape as a form of torture? 
1.2.3. Does the South African state have a legal obligation to practice due diligence and 
take positive steps in reducing and preventing rape among private citizens? 
 
15 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984); from 
here, this agreement will be referenced in text as ‘the Torture Convention’. 
16 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979); from here, this 
agreement will be referenced in text as ‘CEDAW’. 
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1.2.4. Does South Africa fail in fulfilling its legal obligations under international law, 
specifically in reference to the Torture Convention and CEDAW, with regards to 
taking positive steps in reducing and preventing rape?  
 
1.3.STRUCTURE AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The remainder of this paper will be dealt with in four sections: 
Chapter 2 will discuss the legal definitions of ‘rape’ and torture’ in South African and 
domestic law. The main elements of each definition will be discussed in turn. For rape, those 
elements include intention on the part of the perpetrator, sexual penetration and a lack of 
consent on the part of the victim. For torture, the element of ‘severe pain and suffering’ will be 
dealt with; as the South African definition of torture comprises of two subsections, each 
subsection will be discussed in turn.  
Chapter 3 will address a general history of the development of rape laws, followed by the 
international laws pertaining to rape and torture; whether or not states have an obligation under 
international law to protect against harmful acts committed by private individuals will be 
discussed. Thereafter, African regional laws will be discussed. This will be followed by a brief 
consideration of the relationship between rape and torture in certain other regions, namely the 
Inter-American legal region and the European Union legal region. The link between the laws 
that govern the crimes of rape and torture will be a running theme throughout. 
Chapter 4 will address the current South African law in relation to the protection of women 
from acts of rape and torture. It will explore whether South Africa is under a legal obligation 
to reduce and prevent the amount of rapes that take place in the country. The pieces of 
legislation that will be considered include the Constitution, the Prevention of Combating and 
Torture of Persons Act,17 the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment 
Act,18 and the Domestic Violence Act.19 This Chapter will discuss whether rape may be 
considered as a form of torture in South Africa. Finally, this Chapter will discuss whether the 
 
17 Prevention of Combating and Torture of Persons Act 13 of 2013; from here, this document will be referred 
to in text as ‘the Torture Act’. 
18 Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007; from here, this document 
will be referred to in text as ‘the Sexual Offences Act’. 
19 Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998; for the purposes of this paper, the Domestic Violence Act will only be 
referred to in terms of sexual offences, such as rape, among others. 
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state of South Africa, through its law and the implementation of such law, is in violation of its 
obligations under international treaties. 
Chapter 5, the conclusion, will present a summary of the main findings of this paper with 



























Chapter 2 will address the legal definitions of ‘rape’ and torture’ in South African and 
domestic law. The main elements of each definition will be discussed in turn. For rape, those 
elements include intention on the part of the perpetrator, sexual penetration and a lack of 
consent on the part of the victim. For torture, the element of ‘severe pain and suffering’ will be 
dealt with; as the South African definition of torture comprises of two subsections, each 
subsection will be discussed in turn.  
 
2.2.THE DEFINITION OF RAPE 
 
Section 3 of the South African Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) 
Amendment Act provides that ‘any person (‘A’) who unlawfully and intentionally commits an 
act of sexual penetration with a complainant (‘B’), without the consent of B, is guilty of the 
offence of rape’.20 As mentioned above the three main elements found in the South African 
(and many other countries) definition of rape are: intention, sexual penetration and lack of 
consent.21 As such, it is inferred that all three elements must be present in order for an act to be 
considered as rape. The scope of each of these elements in South African law will be explored 




The element of intention, or mens rea (the mental element of the crime of rape), refers to 
the state of mind of the perpetrator during the occurrence of the crime. In the instance of rape, 
the perpetrator must have the ‘intent to sexually penetrate the complainant [with the foresight 
or knowledge] that the complainant has not consent to the act of penetration’.22 This seems to 
 
20 Section 3 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007. 
21 DW Denno ‘Evolutionary Biology and Rape’ (1999) 39 Jurimetrics 243 at 244. 
22 R v K 1958 (3) SA 420 (A) at page 421; Burchell op cit (n 4) at 609. 
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suggest that if the perpetrator reasonably believes that the victim consented, then the former 
will not be guilty of rape.23 In order for the perpetrator’s belief to be considered reasonably, it 
is implied that the victim gave some indication of consent as to the sexual assault. It is due to 
the personal nature of the crime of rape that this is problematic.24 
Taking into consideration that there are often no witnesses to the crime of rape, providing 
evidence as to intention and lack of consent may become difficult on the part of the victim.25 
Additionally, taking into consideration the power imbalances between men and women, even 
today, it is easy to put the scrutiny on the female victim when the male perpetrator, in most 
cases, claims that he believed that the woman had given her consent. Thus, in allowing the 
perpetrator this defence of ‘assumed consent’, the victim’s actual lack of consent may be said 
to be often disregarded. Such situations may often arise when the perpetrator believes that he 
has a right over the victim; for example, when the act takes place as part of a cultural practice, 
or within a marriage or other relationship. Neither of these instances serve as valid defences 
against a victim’s allegation of rape or sexual assault.26 
In South Africa, the mens rea required for rape is that of dolus eventualis.27 This means 
that if the perpetrator foresees the possibility that the victim might not consent, but proceeds 
with penetration despite this, the mental requirement for the act to constitute rape will be 
satisfied.28 Whether or not the victim consented would be determined by the perpetrator’s 
actual bona fide intention rather than by its alleged interpretation of the victim’s actions.29 In 
this way, the victim’s actual lack of consent is respected by South African law. 
However, unless the perpetrator admits his intention to commit rape, it is incredibly 
difficult to know with certainty what his true intention was at the time that the incident took 
place. It is, therefore, necessary to consider the facts of what happened, and from those facts, 
attempt to determine what the perpetrator’s true intention was at the time of the sexual assault. 
 
23 Burchell op cit (n 4) at 609. 
24 Bachman op cit (n6) at 560. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Section 56 (1) of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007; It 
should be noted that the only instances in which cultural practices serve as a defence are listed under Sections 
9 and 22 of the Sexual Offences Act, neither of which specifically include rape or sexual assault. 
27 Burchell op cit (n 4) at 611. 
28 Ibid. 
29 T Illsey ‘The defence of mistaken belief in consent’ (2008) 1 South African Computer Journal 72; Burchell op 
cit (n 4) at 609. 
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In other words, in order to confirm the perpetrator’s subjective intention at the time of the rape, 
it is necessary to rely on objective evidence as well.30 
 
2.2.2. SEXUAL PENETRATION 
 
The element of sexual penetration, or the actus reas (the physical element of the crime of 
rape) refers to the insertion of any body part or object into the orifice of another person.31 In 
South Africa, the term ‘sexual penetration’ is preferred over the term ‘sexual intercourse’ in 
both the common law and legislation.32 Prior to the Constitutional Court case of S v Masiya 
and the Sexual Offences Act,33 the common law definition of rape described the act as sexual 
intercourse which was limited to penile/ vaginal penetration only.34 The term ‘sexual 
penetration’, on the other hand, broadened the definition to include the perpetrator using 
objects, genital organs or other body parts to penetrate the mouth, anus, or genital organs of 
the victim.35 
The sexual penetration element in the crime of rape is often linked with factors such as 
force and resistance. Although these two factors are not specifically included as requirements 
in many jurisdictions, including under Section 3 of the Sexual Offences Act,36 it can be said 
that evidence of force on the part of the perpetrator, and resistance on the part of the victim 
may serve as further proof that the assault was intentionally not consensual. Put differently, 
perpetrators are more likely to be found guilty by law enforcement, ranging from police officers 
to the judges of the court, when the claim of non-consensual sexual assault is accompanied by 
proof of physical force and resistance.37 This may be seen as part of the objective evidence 
required in order to determine the intention of the perpetrator and whether there was consent 
on the part of the victim.38 
 
30 Illsey op cit (n 29) at 65. 
31 Burchell op cit (n 4) at 608; the term ‘sexual penetration; goes beyond penile/ vaginal rape to include the 
above.  
32 Ibid. 
33 S v Masiya 2007 (2) SACR 435 (CC). 
34 Burchell op cit (n 4) at 598). 
35 Burchell op cit (n 4) at 608; The genital organs and other body parts, as referenced above, may form part of 
being a human being or an animal.  
36 Section 3 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007. 




An example of such physical force and resistance is the damage that the victim incurs to 
her genital organs as a result of forced penetration.39 Provided that the victim undergoes a 
medical examination as soon as possible after the incidence, evidence of such force may be 
obtained.40 Unfortunately, however, in far too many instances and for a vast number of reasons, 
many women do not report rape or other kinds of sexual assault, neither to a police officer nor 
to a doctor, in time;41 rape victims often do not even inform those closest to them of the 
incident.42 As such, in many cases, it may be said that objective evidence of forced sexual 
penetration is difficult to obtain, and even more so once time has passed and wounds incurred 
from the rape have healed.  
 
2.2.3. LACK OF CONSENT 
 
In the context of South African law, consent refers to both parties involved ‘voluntarily or 
without coercion’ agreeing to sexual penetration;43 both parties must share a meeting of the 
minds.44 Thus, where there is a lack of consent (on the part of the victim), the act is considered 
to be rape.  
This element of consent, however is one that may easily be confused with submission.45 
Consent, on the one hand, is present when a woman who is control of her mind and body, freely 
and unconstrainedly agrees to submit to sexual penetration.46 On the other hand, submission 
alone may be considered as the appearance of consent but without consent being present. In 
other words, in terms of sexual penetration, with consent comes submission, however the 
converse cannot be said as submission, express or implied, does not necessarily involve 
consent.47 There are many instances in which victims of sexual assault may choose to submit, 
although not consent to their perpetrators.  
 
39 Jaars and Another v S (2018) SAGPJHC 428. 
40 K Naidoo ‘Rape in South Africa – a Call to Action’ (2013) 103 The South African Medical Journal 210 at 210. 
41 N du Plessis, A Kagee and A Maw ‘Women’s Experiences of Reporting Rape to the Police:  A Qualitative 
Study’ (2009) 45 Social Work 275 at 276.  
42 Ibid. 
43 Burchell op cit (n 4) at 604; R v Swiggelaar 1950 (1) H61 (A) at 110 – 111. 
44 Burchell op cit (n 4) at 222. 
45 GE Panichas ‘Rape, Autonomy, and Consent’ (2001) 35 Law and Society’s Review 231 at  
46 EW Puttkammer ‘Consent in Rape’ (1925) 19 Illinois Law Review 410 at 410. 
47 Burchell op cit (n 4) at 223; S v S 1971 (2) 591 (A) at page 596. 
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When women are subject to the crime of rape, there is often the possibility of being harmed 
further or even killed by their male perpetrator(s).48 It may be due to this immediate threat of 
further harm to themselves or others, which may not always cumulate in actual harm, that 
women decide to submit rather than resist. Victims of sexual assault may also be overpowered 
by their perpetrator, whether physically or through being drugged, and, as such, not have an 
opportunity to resist. Submission in the face of the above does not constitute consent to sexual 
penetration; South African criminal law provides that where consent was given due to duress 
or intimidation by another, such consent is treated as never having been given.49 
The Sexual Offences Act describes a number of instances in which it is impossible for 
consent or the appearance thereof (submission) to be given by the victim, but which will be 
considered as invalid due to the nature of the situation. For example, where the victim is legally 
incapable of providing her consent,50 or where she is unable to ‘appreciate the nature of the 
act’,51 any consent that she provides will be considered as invalid.  
Similarly, the consent of a victim may be considered invalid when she has been forced to 
consent to a perpetrator’s abuse of authority.52 Such authority may present itself in the form of 
a superior in the workplace, a doctor, a teacher, or a police officer, among many others.53 The 
victim’s submission in this context will not be considered as consent.54 An example of this was 
found in the case of S v Egglestone.55 This matter concerned the perpetrator having offered the 
victim a job in a new post56 During her training, the perpetrator took advantage of her after 
telling her that she would not get the job if she did not have sex with him.57 The Supreme Court 
of Appeal held that, due to the perpetrator being older and in a position of power over the 
victim, she was not able to give true consent.58 
 
48 JA Scutt ‘Consent Versus Submission: Threats and the Element of Fear in Rape’ (1977) 13 Western Australian 
Law Review 52 at 57 
49 Ex Parte Minister of Justice: In re R v Gesa; R v De Jongh 1959 (1) SA 234 (A) at 240; Burchell op cit (n 4) at 
223; Section 1 (3) (a) of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007. 
50 Section 1 (3) (d) of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007. 
51 Section 1 (3) (d) of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007. 
52 Section 1 (3) (b) of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007. 
53 Panchias op cit (n 45) at 260. 
54 Section 1 (3) (b) of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007. 
55 S v Egglestone 2009 (1) SACR 244 (SCA).  
56 S v Egglestone supra (n 54) at para 23. 
57 Ibid. 
58 S v Egglestone supra (n 54) at para 27. 
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All of the above results in the act of sexual penetration being considered as rape having 
taken place. In this way, South African law protects the victim that is unable to protect 
themselves and respects the victim’s lack of consent.  
 
2.3.THE DEFINITION OF TORTURE 
 
Section 3 of the Prevention of Combating and Torture of Persons Act provides that the 
crime constitutes ‘any act by which severe pain and suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person’ in order to gain information from, intimidate or coerce the 
omission or commission of an action from, to punish or to discriminate against the victim ‘or 
any other person’ on any ground.59 The definition goes on to provide that in order to constitute 
torture, the act must be performed by, at the instigation of, or with the consent of a public 
official acting in an official capacity.60 Elements from this definition will be further discussed 
below, namely the different purposes for which an act can be considered as torture, as well as 
the public official element.  
 
2.3.1. “FOR SUCH PURPOSES AS” 
 
The Torture Act provides that torture consists of severe mental or physical pain and 
suffering either to the victim, or any other person.61 By including the above, the Torture Act 
recognises the link between mental and physical torture; it recognises that physical torture may 
result in mental torture, something that can last for years after the physical incident took place, 
sometimes in the form of post-traumatic stress disorder.62 Those upon whom the main and 
suffering are not directly inflicted, but who may have been witness to such torture, or who were 
closely linked to the act or victim are acknowledged, as well.63 
 
59 Section 3 (a) and (b) of the Prevention of Combating and Torture of Persons Act 13 of 2013. 
60 Section 3 of the Prevention of Combating and Torture of Persons Act 13 of 2013. 
61 Section 3 of the Prevention of Combating and Torture of Persons Act 13 of 2013. 
62 AC de C Williams and J van der Merwe ‘The Psychological Impact of Torture’ (2013) 7 British Journal of Pain 
101 at 103. 
63 L Fernandez and L Muntingh ‘The Criminalization of Torture in South Africa’ (2016) 60 Journal of African Law 
83 at 92. 
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The Torture Act provides further that an act of torture requires the ‘severe pain and 
suffering’ to inflicted for a number of purposes, as are listed above.64 In accordance with the 
wording ‘for such purposes as,’ it appears that this is not an exhaustive list; this list of 
prohibited purposes may be added to in the future, whether through case law or through altering 
the legislation. This is especially true with regards to ‘discrimination of any kind’.65 Taking 
into consideration that South African law surrounding discrimination is both incredibly 
comprehensive, and yet still open to additions and alterations,66 the element of discrimination 
in the crime of torture may include a great many things. It can be argued that discrimination, 
along with the other purposes listed above, may be inclusive of the various reasons for which 
sexual assaults take place. 
 
2.3.2. DISCRIMINATION BY A PUBLIC OFFICIAL 
 
The Torture Act provides that the act must involve a public official who is acting in an 
official capacity.67 The term ‘public official’ is defined in the Torture Act as ‘any person 
holding public office or purporting to exercise a public power or a public function in terms of 
any legislation’.68  
In essence, this definition seems to indicate that a public official is someone who is part of 
the state or who is a representative thereof. a ‘public official’ may also be interpreted as one 
who is integrated within society as an authority enforcer; one who wields power over a group 
of people.69 This may be widely interpreted to include members of the government, policemen, 
adjudicators, and traditional African chiefs or leaders, among many others who are granted 
public authority by South African legislation.70 
Further, this definition makes it clear that the act of torture must be carried out by, instigated 
by, or with the consent of a public official who is acting in their official capacity. This means 
that private individuals or companies acting for private persons, or who are not acting with the 
 
64 Section 3 (a) of the Prevention of Combating and Torture of Persons Act 13 of 2013. 
65 Section 3 (b) of the Prevention of Combating and Torture of Persons Act 13 of 2013. 
66 Section 1 (b) of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (listed under 
‘prohibited grounds’). 
67 Section 3 of the Prevention of Combating and Torture of Persons Act 13 of 2013. 
68 Section 1 of the Prevention of Combating and Torture of Persons Act 13 of 2013. 




involvement of a public official may not necessarily be held responsible for the crime of 
torture.71 Public officials who are not acting in an official capacity may not be held liable for 
the crime of torture either.72 In this way, by specifying the official capacity requirement, the 
Torture Act effectively ensures that an act of torture will result in the state (or a representative 
thereof) being held liable. While this is incredibly necessary in order to hold public officials 
and the state accountable for their actions, and to ensure that they act within the bounds of the 
law, it may be said that the definition of a ‘public official’ is incredibly limiting.  
If it is possible for public officials who are acting in their official capacity to carry out acts 
of torture, the same can certainly be said for private individuals or ‘off duty’ public officials. 
However, when this act is carried out by the latter, it is not considered as one of torture, but is 
rather classified as something else. To put this in other words, if the exact same act were to be 
carried out by a public official and by a private person (with no involvement of a public official) 
for such purposes as those listed in the definition of torture, only one act would be classified 
as torture; the weight, connotations and legal consequences that are attached to the term 
‘torture’ will not be attributed to a heinous act committed by a private person. It may be argued 
that this limitation is somewhat of an oversight in the Torture Act. Once again, while it is 
necessary to have such a provision keeping the state and public officials in line, perhaps it 
should be considered that private persons acting of their own accord should be included among 
those who are capable of committing acts of torture, as envisioned by South African legislation.  
It bears worth mentioning that both the Preamble and Section 2 (1) (a) of the Torture Act 
mentions the importance of upholding and giving effect to and carrying out its obligations 
under the Torture Convention.73 It is clear that the definition of torture both in the Torture 
Convention and the Torture Act does not limit acts of torture to being carried out by public 
officials; an act constitutes torture when a public official has provided their consent or has 
knowledge of the act as well.74 As such, it may be said that there exists a potential of a doctrine 
of due diligence being applied in certain instances in order for an act to constitute as torture.75  
This seems to indicate that, despite the requirement of a public official being involved in 
the act in order for it to be considered as one of torture, the Torture Convention may consider 
 
71 Fernandez op cit (n 63) at 97. 
72 Fernandez op cit (n 63) at 96. 
73 Preamble and Section 2 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Combating and Torture of Persons Act 13 of 2013. 
74 K Fortin ‘Rape as Torture – An Evaluation of the Committee Against Torture’s Attitude to Sexual Violence’ 
(2008) 4 Utrecht Law Review 145 at 153. 
75 Fortin op cit (n 74) at 146. 
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harmful acts perpetrated by and upon private individuals to be the responsibility of the state to 
prevent.76 It may be argued that this responsibility, despite not being specifically mentioned in 




This Chapter has examined the definition of the crime of rape in a South African legal 
context. It has been found that the intention required for the crime of rape is that of dolus 
eventualis, a form of mens rea that requires the perpetrator to foresee the possibility that the 
victim might not consent but continues with the act despite this; the true subjective intention 
of the perpetrator is usually determined after considering the objective facts of the incident. 
It has been found further, that with regards to the remaining two elements of the crime of 
rape (sexual penetration and lack of consent), there is a vast difference between consent and 
submission. When a woman consents to sexual penetration, there is submission, however, the 
converse is not always true; there may be submission (the appearance of consent), but no actual 
consent on the part of the victim. This may occur for a number of reasons, including the victim 
fearing further harm being done to her by the perpetrator. In these instances, the victim’s 
appearance of consent will be considered invalid.  
In relation to the crime of torture, it has been found that there is a requirement of severe 
pain and suffering being inflicted (for a number of purposes) by a public official. This Chapter 
has put forward that, considering its intention to give effect to the Torture Convention, the 
Torture Act may expand the scope of what constitutes the state’s responsibility in terms of 
preventing acts of torture from those acts inflicted to public officials only, to those which are 






76 Fortin op cit (n 74) at 153. 
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Awareness and the attitudes of society surrounding the crime of rape have evolved 
tremendously over the last few decades, and with it, rape law itself. This Chapter will explore 
a general history of the development of rape laws, followed by the international laws pertaining 
to rape and torture; whether or not states have an obligation under international law to protect 
against harmful acts committed by private individuals will be discussed. Thereafter, African 
regional laws will be discussed. This will be followed by a brief consideration of the 
relationship between rape and torture in certain other regions, namely the Inter-American legal 
region and the European Union legal region. The link between the laws that govern the crimes 
of rape and torture will be a running theme throughout. 
 
3.2.A BRIEF HISTORY 
 
For a very long time, under English law, rape was considered to be a crime against a man’s 
property.77 When an unmarried woman (or young girl) was raped, it was often considered to 
be a crime against the head of her household – usually her father – as the loss of her chastity 
brought dishonour on the family and reduced her value as a ‘pure’ bride.78 Some laws provided 
that the perpetrator pay a fine to the household head,79 while others see the rapist put to death.80 
In some cultures, the victim was forced to marry her perpetrator on account of preserving her 
family’s honour;81 different versions of this are still practiced in some societies today.82 Most 
laws required that claims of rape had to be extra-marital; it was not possible for husbands to 
rape their wives.83 This, too, is a modern day reality in some states.84 
 
77 LN Henderson ‘What Makes Rape a Crime’ (1988) 3 Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 193 at 219. 
78 CJ Smith ‘History of Rape and Rape Laws’ (1975) 6 International Bar Journal 33 at 34. 
79 Smith op cit (n 78) at 39. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Smith op cit (n 78) at 38. 
82 C Monayne ‘Is Ukuthwala Another Form of ‘Forced Marriage’?’ (2013) 44 South African Review of Sociology 
64 at 78. 
83 Smith op cit (n 87) at 38. 
84 Section 375 Exception 2 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013. 
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Although rape laws slowly progressed through the years, it was only in the 1970s, in no 
small part due to the actions of feminist and women’s liberation movements of that time, that 
women’s human and reproductive rights were given more public importance.85 It was during 
this time that the definitional and evidentiary requirements of rape became more 
comprehensive and less accommodating of the patriarchal view of the crime.86 Unfortunately, 
despite the changes in the law, the patriarchal view of rape was still deeply ingrained into 
society. As such, while the rape reform laws that took effect in the 1970s had a significant 
impact on paper, it did not have the desired effect in reality; rape reports and convictions 
remained low.87 
Since that time, many efforts have been taken to further develop laws against rape, and then 
have those changes and development reflected in society. This effort is ongoing, and likely will 




The rights of women in the international sphere have developed dramatically from the 
adoption of the United Nations Charter.88 Today, international law protects the rights of 
women, ranging from their rights to be seen as equal with men,89 to their rights not to be 
discriminated against,90 to the rights not to be abused or sexually assaulted.91 Some of the 
international agreements that embody these rights – and to which South Africa is a state party 




85 CC Spohn ‘The Rape Reform Movement: The Traditional Common Law and Rape Law Reforms’ (1999) 39 
Jurimetrics 119 at 121. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Spohn op cit (n 85) at 129. 
88 The United Nations Charter (1945); This was the founding document of the United Nations as we know it. It 
promoted equality and prohibited discrimination on the bases of sex, race, language, and religion. 
89 Article 1 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979).  
90 Ibid. 
91 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women General Recommendation 
No. 19: Violence Against Women (1992) at para 24 (b); from here, this document will be referred to in text as 
‘General Recommendation 19’. 
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3.3.1. UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
The UDHR was adopted in 1948 by the United Nations General Assembly.92 It contains a 
list of fundamental human rights that is applicable throughout the international sphere. 
Although the UDHR does not specifically mention it, the right to be protected against rape and 
sexual assault may be interpreted and read into the international agreement, specifically into 
Article 5.93 
Article 5 of the UDHR provides that ‘no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’.94 Given that the wording the Article is so 
wide, it is highly possible that a number of rights are encompassed within it, including the 
rights of women to be protected from violence, rights to bodily integrity and dignity; all these 
rights should supposedly protect women from rape.95 When a woman is subjected to the crimes 
of rape or sexual assault, the abovementioned rights are deeply violated. The Committee 
against Torture, the monitoring body of the Convention bearing the same title as Article 5, 
expands on this by providing that rape is considered as a form of torture and that states party 
to the Convention have an obligation to ‘prevent and protect victims from gender-based 
violence, such as rape, [sexual assault, violence and abuse]’.96 In other words, states are 
responsible for protecting the rights of its people.  
Although the UDHR was the first, there came a number of human rights treaties, some of 
which attempt to address the issue of violence against women.97 However, this attempt is made 
through gender neutral provisions, such as those providing for the rights to life, equality, 
freedom, and non-discrimination. Due to the matter never being specifically addressed, it is 
necessary for the right of women to be protected against violence and sexual assault to be 
interpreted and read into the wide provisions of international human rights agreements.  
 
 
92 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). 
93 Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). 
94 Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). 
95 K Donnah Dealing with Rape as a Human Rights Violation under Gacaca Justice System LLM (Pretoria) 2003 
at 21. 
96 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984) 
General Comment No. 2 at para 18. 
97 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966); International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (1966); International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965). 
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3.3.2. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITIARIAN LAW 
 
One of the earliest and more explicit prohibitions of rape can be found under international 
humanitarian law, as a set of rules that aim to protect civilians and limit the damage and effects 
that armed conflict can have on a country and its people.98 Specifically, this prohibition can be 
found in Article 27 of the Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War 12 August 1949, the first of the four Geneva Conventions which 
address humanitarian protection for civilians as well as for combatants during both 
international and non-international armed conflicts.99 This prohibition was reiterated in an 
Additional Protocol to Geneva Convention IV in 1977.100  
These provisions are incredibly important as, even though rape does not constitute a grave 
breach of Geneva Convention IV in terms of definition,101 it may be argued that the need to 
protect women and women’s rights to bodily integrity was recognised and acted upon.102 
Perhaps these provisions even laid the groundwork for the crime of rape to be considered as a 




98 International Committee of the Red Cross ‘What is International Humanitarian Law?’ International 
Committee of the Red Cross, 31 December 2014, available at https://www.icrc.org/en/document/what-
international-humanitarian-law, accessed on  3 December 2018; JM Henkaerts and L Dowald-Beck ‘Customary 
International Humanitarian Law Volume I: Rules’ International Committee of the Red Cross, 2005, available at 
https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/customary-international-humanitarian-law-i-icrc-eng.pdf, 
accessed on 4 December 2018 at page 323. 
99 Article 3 and Article 27 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War of 12 August 1949; from here, this document will be referred to in text as ‘Geneva Convention IV’. 
100 Article 4 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II); from here, this document will be 
referred to in text as ‘Additional Protocol II’); D Blatt ‘Recognising Rape as a Method of Torture’ (1991) 19 
Review of Law and Social Change 821 at 831. 
101 Article 147 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 
August 1949; A Crowe ‘All the Regard due to their Sex’: Women in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, Human 
Dreams Program, December 2006, available at http://hrp.law.harvard.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/12/Anna-Crowe_HRP-16_001.pdf, 4 December 2018 at page 11. 
102 CL Chiasson ‘Silenced Voices: Sexual Violence During and After World War II’, The Aquila Digital Company 
2015, available at https://aquila.usm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1336&context=honors_theses, accessed 
on 5 December at page 19; During armed conflict, even today, rape is used as a tool of discrimination.  
24 
 
3.3.3. CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN 
OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 
 
The United Nations Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment gives effect to Article 5 of the UDHR, as indicated above.103 Article 
2 of the Torture Convention provides that states must take effective legal steps to ‘prevent acts 
of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction’.104 It further provides that states must ensure 
that a victim of torture within its jurisdiction has access to redress and adequate compensation, 
including rehabilitation.105 
The term ‘torture’ is defined in the Torture Convention as:106 
‘…any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as [obtaining information or a 
confession, punishment for an act committed, or suspected to have been, intimidation, 
coercion], or for any other reason based on discrimination of any kind [provided that 
the suffering is inflicted by, at the instigation of, or with the consent of] a public 
official or another person acting in an official capacity.’ 
This definition bears a great resemblance to the South African legal definition of ‘torture’ 
due to the latter being based off the former. As with the South African definition, the Torture 
Convention provides that an act will only be considered as torture if performed by, with the 
consent or knowledge of a public official ‘acting in its official capacity’. Similarly, Article 16 
of the Torture Convention provides the same for acts of ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment which do not amount to torture’.107 
The above definition does not specify any acts whereby pain and suffering are inflicted 
upon the victim to such an extent that it might be considered as torture. However, over time, 
the definition of torture has been interpreted, developed and expanded upon by various sources. 
 
103 The Convention Against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984). 
104 Article 2 of the Convention Against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (1984). 
105 Article 14 of the Convention Against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (1984). 
106 Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (1984). 




One such example of development is the inclusion of the crime of rape as a form of torture in 
international law.  
In 1998, the Akayesu case was issued by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.108 
This was the first of three cases which will be discussed below with regards to rape constituting 
a form of torture. In this case, not only was it provided that the crime of rape constituted a 
‘form of aggression’,109 but it was also recognised by the ICTR that rape and torture could be 
likened to one another.110 According to the ICTR, both torture and rape constitute a ‘violation 
of personal dignity’ and can be used for ‘such purposes as intimidating, degradation, 
humiliation, discrimination, punishment, control of [the] destruction of a person’.111 
This was further added to by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
in the Čelebići case in November 1998, in which the crime of rape was explicitly recognised 
as a form of torture.112 It further recognised the negative societal stigmas attached to the crime 
of torture, from which the victim would likely suffer as well.113 After identifying the elements 
of torture in accordance with the ICTY Statute and the Torture Convention, the ICTY provided 
that where an incident of rape occurred between a public official and a detainee during a time 
of armed conflict, and it met the identified elements, the act would constitute torture.114 The 
ICTY further provided that rapes which constituted torture were to be seen as war crimes as 
well as a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions.115 
Later that year, in December 1998, the ICTY made use of a similar line of reasoning in the 
case of Furundžija.116 This case found a Serbian commander guilty of the crime of torture in 
that he aided and abetted the crime of a detainee under his watch.117 Once again, the ICTY 
 
108 ICTR, The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu (1998) ICTR – 96 – 4 – T, Trial Chamber Judgment of 12 
September 1998; from here, the ‘International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’ will be referred to in text as ‘the 
ICTR’. 
109 The Prosecutor v Jean Paul Akayesu supra (n 108) at 597. 
110 Ibid.  
111 Ibid.  
112 ICTY, The Prosecutor v Zdravko Mucić aka ‘Pavo’, Hazim Delić, Esad Landžo aka ‘Zenga’, Zejnil Delalić (1998) 
IT – 96 – 21 – T, Trial Chamber Judgment of 16 November 1998; from here, the ‘International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia’ will be referred to in text as the ‘ICTY’. 
113 The Prosecutor v Zdravko Mucić supra (n 112) at 448. 
114 The Prosecutor v Zdravko Mucić supra (n 112) at 496. 
115 The Prosecutor v Zdravko Mucić supra (n 112) at 943; S Fulton ‘Redress for Rape: Using International 
Jurisprudence on Rape as a form of Torture or other Ill-Treatment’ Redress October 2013, available at 
https://redress.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/final-rape-as-torture1.pdf, accessed on 5 December 2018 at 
page 20. 
116 ICTY, The Prosecutor v Anto Furundžija (1998) Trial Chamber Judgment of 10 December 1998. 
117 ICTY, The Prosecutor v Anto Furundžija supra (n 116) at 183. 
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recognised the link between rape and torture in the physical and psychological damage they 
cause.118 
Taking the above into consideration, it can be said that international case law, specifically 
those judgments being issued from the ICTR and the ICTY, deems the crime of rape as a form 
of torture. However, this is only so when the act of rape meets the requirements of torture, as 
are set out in the case of Čelebići, which require the act to be carried out by, or with the 
knowledge or consent of a person of authority.119 
After a decade, in 2008, a further development was made when the Committee against 
Torture released General Comment No. 2 of the Torture Convention.120 General Comment 2 
provided that if a person in a position of authority acting in an official capacity, knows or 
reasonably believes that ‘acts of torture … are being committed by non-state officials or private 
actors’,121 they must act so as to ‘prevent, investigate, prosecute and punish such 
perpetrators’.122 Failure to do so will result in the person of authority being considered as 
complicity to the crime of torture as ‘indifference or inaction’ will be considered as akin to 
permission or encouragement.123 General Comment 2 provided further that the crime of torture 
includes ‘gender-based violence such as rape, domestic violence, female genital mutilation, 
and trafficking’.124 
The addition of General Comment 2 shows tremendous progression in terms of how the 
crime of rape is being thought of in the international sphere. General Comment 2 is classified 
as soft law and, as such, it is not strictly binding upon state parties.125 However, it does carry 
weight in clarifying and informing certain sections of the main international agreement.126 It 
appears that the inclusion of rape as a form of torture lends insight into the gravity of how 
 
118 ICTY, The Prosecutor v Anto Furundžija supra (n 116) at 95 and at 170. 
119 The Prosecutor v Zdravko Mucić supra (n 112) at 496. 
120 The Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment General 
Comment No. 2: Implementation of Article 2 by State Parties (2008). 
121 The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment General 




125 M Barelli ‘The Role of Soft Law in the International Legal System: The Case of the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (2009) 58 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
957 at 959. 
126 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner ‘Human Rights Treaty Bodies – General 
Comments’ OHCHR 1996 – 2020, available at 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/TBGeneralComments.aspx, accessed on 8 January 2019. 
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heinous the crime of rape is.127 It serves as an encouragement to states to take more extensive 
and positive precautions in preventing further acts of torture in the form of rape and other 
gender-based violence.128 Further, it not only emphasises the need for states to monitor and 
hold their public officials accountable for their actions, but it urges states to take a more 
proactive stance in decreasing the amount of rapes that take place.129 
It is possible that this line of thinking reflected above with regards to General Comment 2 
stems from the definition of torture itself. As mentioned above, the definition of torture does 
allow for acts of torture to be carried out by non-state or private actors, so long as the act was 
instigated by, consented to or acquiesced by a public official.130 It may be argued that from 
this, a due diligence doctrine may be applied and in so doing, the state may be held for ‘its 
failure to protect individuals from human rights abuses by private actors’.131 Essentially, if it 
is applied, much like Article 15 of General Comment 2 above, this would place a positive 
obligation upon the state to prevent acts of harm from being conducted by private individuals, 
or otherwise be held accountable for failure to comply with international legislation.132 
In the matter concerning Hajrizi Dzemajl et al v. Serbia and Montenegro,133 the Committee 
Against Torture provided that states have an obligation to prevent harm from being conducted 
by private actors.134 This case involved sexual assault and misconduct. Although this finding 
was based off of the specific facts of the matter, the judgment provides no indication that a 
more general obligation, with regards to different crimes that may amount to torture, is not 
owed and that it is applicable to all states.135 It is put forward that there is no reason why a 
general obligation should not be applied with regards to the state having the duty to practice 
due diligence and prevent private actors from conducting harm upon others, including in the 
form of rape. 136 
 
127 FD Gaer ‘Rape as a Form of Torture: The Experience of the Committee Against Torture’ (2012) 15 City 
University of New York Law Review 293 at 296. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Gaer op cit (n 127) at 297. 
130 Fortin op cit (n 74) at 153. 
131 Fortin op cit (n 74) at 153; Gaer op cit (n 127) at 297; I Cherneva ‘Recognising Rape as Torture: The 
Evolution of Women’s Rights Legal Protective Techniques’ (2011) 6 Intercultural Human Rights Law Review 325 
at 332. 
132 Cherneva op cit (n 131) at 335. 
133 CAT, Hajrizi Dzemajl et al. v Yugoslavia, CAT/ C/ 29/ D/ 161/ 2000, United Nations Committee Against 
Torture, 2 December 2002. 
134 Hajrizi Dzemajl v Yugoslavia supra (n 133) at para 8.9. 




As such, it can be said that the Torture Convention, through an interpretation of its 
definition, places a responsibility upon the state to prevent and prohibit acts of torture and ill-
treatment in all contexts, including instances involving the infliction of harm on and by private 
persons where the state failed to intervene. This may be an indication that while, on a more 
literal level, the definition of torture pertains to the acts of public officials or any other person 
acting ‘under the colour of law’, the Torture Convention may give rise to the more onerous 
task of states taking responsibility for the acts of private individuals. This is incredibly 
important regarding the crime of rape potentially being considered as a form of torture.  
More often than not, apart, perhaps, from during times of conflict, the crime of rape usually 
takes place between private individuals rather than being perpetrated by public officials, 
thought these occurrences do take place. If the definition of torture places the responsibility 
upon states to prevent acts of harm between private persons, it is put forward that the state has 
an obligation to take steps in prohibiting and preventing the crime of rape from taking place in 
the private sphere. Unlike General Comment 2, the obligations under the Torture Convention 
are not considered as soft law, but as a binding agreement. 
 
3.3.4. THE CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF 
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN 
 
Attitudes towards women’s human rights and the emphasis on states to protect those rights 
expands far beyond the Torture Convention. The CEDAW is described as the ‘international 
bill of rights for women’.137 Under this Convention, however, it appears that there is only one 
provisions directly linked to a manifestation of the protection of women against violence. This 
provision provides for the protection of women against human trafficking and exploitation of 
prostitution.138 
The CEDAW Committee recognised this vast exclusion of rights pertaining to the 
protection of women from violence and has, subsequently, adopted a number of General 
Recommendations pertaining to the matter. Due to General Recommendations not being signed 
 
137 United Nations Women ‘Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women’ 
Women Watch, 31 December 2007, available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/, accessed on 
15 November 2018. 
138 Article 6 of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979). 
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and ratified by states, they are not considered as an actual treaty; however, they are considered 
as authoritative additions to CEDAW.139 The General Recommendations allow the Committee 
to comment on matters that are not specifically mentioned in CEDAW, such as the issue of 
violence against women and gender-based violence.  
 
3.3.4.1.GENERAL RECOMMENDATION 19 
 
General Recommendation 19 was adopted in 1992; it was preceded by General 
Recommendation 12 which called upon states to share and report with regards to their 
legislation protecting women from violence.140 General Recommendation 12 required states to 
send in reports regarding violence against women and the laws that governed this issue in each 
country.141 
After reviewing the state reports that were available to them, the CEDAW Committee 
found that many states did not seem to have adequate laws and mechanisms to combat gender-
based discrimination or violence against women142. As a result, General Recommendation 19 
was drafted. Being more strongly worded and comprehensive than its predecessor, General 
Recommendation 19 aimed to urge states in undertaking positive and effective actions that 
would prevent and eliminate violence against women.143  
Much like the Torture Convention, Article 8 of General Recommendation 19 specifically 
addresses the document’s applicability to ‘public authorities’ (in other words, the state, or those 
who are acting on behalf of and representing the state).144 Article 9 goes further to provide that 
states may be found liable for private acts of violence against women if it is found that sufficient 
 
139 M Kanetake ‘United Nations Rights Treaty Monitoring Bodies Before Domestic Courts’ (2017) 67 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 201 at 219. 
140 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women General Recommendation 
No. 12: Violence Against Women (1989) at page 1; from here, this document will be referred to in text as 
‘General Recommendation 12’. 
141 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women General Recommendation 
No. 12: Violence Against Women (1989) at page 1. 
142 Article 4 of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
General Recommendation No. 19: Violence Against Women (1992). 
143 Article 24 (a) of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women General Recommendation No. 19: Violence Against Women (1992); NA Englehart ‘CEDAW and Gender 
Violence: An Empirical Assessment’ (2014) 2014 Michigan State Law Review 265 at 266. 
144 Article 8 of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women 
General Recommendation No. 19: Violence Against Women (1992). 
30 
 
and effective preventative measures have not been taken in regard to this.145 These provisions 
are incredibly important as they emphasise the importance of state accountability when it 
comes to acts of gender-based violence against women, specifically in instances where the 
perpetrator is a private person.  
In the same way that General Recommendation 19 condemns acts of violence against 
women and places and obligation on the state to prevent such acts from taking place, so it also 
provides that women should be protected from acts of torture, ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment’ in both the public and private spheres.146 From this, it may be said 
that a link can be drawn between the crimes of rape (and other gender-based violence against 
women) and torture under General Recommendation 19, albeit an indirect one. General 
Recommendation 19 essentially addresses the responsibilities that states have in preventing 
and prohibiting violence against women.147 Considering that the crime of torture was included 
under those ‘rights and freedoms’ of women that should not be infringed, it may be argued that 
General Recommendation 19 appears to equate the crimes of torture and gender-based violence 
against women. 
A year later, in 1993, the Declaration of Violence against Women was adopted by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations.148 Although this is classified as soft and non-binding 
law,149 it was the first international human rights instrument to explicitly address violence 
against women in both the public and private spheres.150 However, not much difference can be 
seen between DEVAW and General Recommendation 19 with regards to the link between rape 
and torture.  
The crime of rape forms part of the term ‘violence against women’,151 which is condemned 
and prohibited under DEVAW;152 the right not to be subjected to torture is listed under the 
 
145 Article 9 of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women 
General Recommendation No. 19: Violence Against Women (1992). 
146 Section 24 (a) of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against 
Women General Recommendation No. 19: Violence Against Women (1992); Englehart op cit (n 143) at 267. 
147 Englehart op cit (n 143) at 266. 
148 United Nations General Assembly Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, 
A/RES/48/104 (20 December 1993), from here, this document will be referenced in text as ‘DEVAW’. 
149 UA O’Hare ‘Realizing Human Rights for Women’ (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 364 at 379. 
150 O’Hare op cit (n 149) at 365. 
151 Article 2 of the United Nations General Assembly Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against 
Women, A/ RES/ 48/ 104 (20 December 1993.  
152 Article 4 of the United Nations General Assembly Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against 
Women, A/ RES/ 48/ 104 (20 December 1993. 
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protected rights that all women should be afforded.153 The two are never directly linked with 
one another.  
Although DEVAW came into effect before cases such as Akayesu and Čelebići, it is not to 
say that the connections between rape and torture had not been drawn before 1998. Considering 
that the United Nations, a body with a high amount of influence in the international community, 
had the opportunity to address this, but did not, it may be argued that this was a major shortfall 
on their part.  
 
3.3.4.2.GENERAL RECOMMENDATION 35 
 
Approximately 25 years after General Recommendation 19 was adopted, in 2017, General 
Recommendation 35 was adopted by the CEDAW Committee as an updated version of the 
former.154 The CEDAW Committee recognised that, despite the great progression of laws 
against gender-based violence in states throughout the international sphere, the reality reflected 
something different.155 Many states, even after the adoption of General Recommendation 19, 
had inadequate laws in place – and sometimes, poor implementation thereof – pertaining to 
gender-based violence, and more specifically, rape.156 As a result of this, the CEDAW 
Committee built on its message in General Recommendation 19 by placing an emphasis on the 
importance of states throughout the international sphere making an effort to develop a legal 
framework pertaining to the prevention of gender-based violence, specifically relating to 
violence against women, and implementing those laws effectively.157 
 
153 Article 3 of the United Nations General Assembly Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against 
Women, A/ RES/ 48/ 104 (20 December 1993). 
154 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women General 
Recommendation No. 35: Gender-based Violence against Women, Updating General Recommendation No. 19 
(2017); from here, this document will be referred to in text as ‘General Recommendation 35’; Note that 
General Recommendation 35 is not considered as a replacement, but rather as an update of General 
Recommendation 19 – therefore, they should be read in conjunction with one another.  
155 Article 6 of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
General Recommendation No. 35: Gender-based Violence against Women, Updating General 
Recommendation No. 19 (2017). 
156 Article 101 of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women General Recommendation No. 35: Gender-based Violence against Women, Updating General 
Recommendation No. 19 (2017). 
157 Articles 29 – 33 of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women General Recommendation No. 35: Gender-based Violence against Women, Updating General 
Recommendation No. 19 (2017). 
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General Recommendation 35 reiterates that gender-based violence infringes upon the right 
of women not to be subject to acts of torture.158 However, unlike General Recommendation 19, 
it goes on to recognise that there is a direct link between rape and torture, providing that the 
former is a form of the latter.159 This link is informed by the 2016 Special Rapporteur report 
pertaining to torture.160 This recognition is not qualified by the requirement of the involvement 
of a public official, as is the strict definition of the crime of torture. Rather, General 
Recommendation 35 places an obligation on the state to intervene in instances of rape or 
domestic violence, among others.161 It is once again provided that states are responsible for 
carrying out due diligence to stop or prevent private actors from carrying out the crime of 
rape.162  
The progress that has been made with regards to the development of laws protecting women 
from rape is tremendous. This is clear merely by looking at the written domestic laws of several 
countries, South Africa included. However, the fact that the CEDAW Committee felt the need 
to emphasise the same message twice – that states need to start taking responsibility not only 
for the written laws, but for the actual rapes that take place – is somewhat worrying. It may be 
interpreted to indicate that a body of the international community recognises that law is not 
enough, even over two decades after General Recommendation 19 was released. It may be 
argued that by listing gender-based violence as a form of torture, an attempt was made by the 
CEDAW Committee, not unlike the Committee against Torture with General Comment 2, to 
draw attention to the gravity and heinousness of the various crimes that form part of gender-
based violence.  
From the above, it can be said that CEDAW along with its General Recommendations place 
an obligation on states to prevent and prohibit acts of rape and other gender-based violence 
against women. Additionally, it is clear, especially from General Recommendation 35, that the 
 
158 Article 15 of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women General Recommendation No. 35: Gender-based Violence against Women, Updating General 
Recommendation No. 19 (2017). 
159 Article 16 of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women General Recommendation No. 35: Gender-based Violence against Women, Updating General 
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link between the crimes of rape and torture has been developed significantly in international 
law over time. Some of these international agreements have informed regional and domestic 
laws pertaining to these issues as well. 
 
3.4.AFRICAN REGIONAL LAW 
 
It can be said that the African and Western notions of laws and approaches to human rights 
are different based on culture and history, among other things. For this reason, some argue, the 
application of Western laws in African states does not always work.163 The regional laws that 
will be discussed below appear to attempt to find a middle ground between Western human 
rights and African traditions, values and culture. The regional law that will be discussed below 
includes the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, also known as the Banjul 
Charter,164 as well as the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa, also known as the Maputo Protocol.165  
 
3.4.1. THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS 
 
The Banjul Charter was adopted in 1981 and it is considered to be the foundational human 
rights document for the African continent.166 This regional agreement, for the most part, 
contains gender-neutral language. The only specific mention of women can be found in Article 
18 which provides that states ‘shall ensure the elimination of every discrimination of women 
…’.167 
Apart from Article 18, the main gender-neutral provisions of the Banjul Charter that protect 
women from discrimination include the rights for all persons to be protected from non-
 
163 C Nicholson ‘Some Preliminary Thoughts on a Comparative Law Model for Harmonisation of Laws in Africa’ 
(2008) 14 Fundamina 50 at 52. 
164 The Organisation of African Unity (now African Union) African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights CAB/ 
LEG/ 67/ 3 rev. 5, 21 I. L. M. 58 (1982) (27 June 1981); from here, this document will be referenced in text as 
‘the Banjul Charter’. 
165 The African Union Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in 
Africa (11 July 2003); from here, this document will be referenced in text as ‘the Maputo Protocol’. 
166 C Heyns ‘The African Regional Human Rights System: The African Charter’ (2004) 108 Penn State Law 
Review 679 at 685. 
167 Article 18 (3) of the Organisation of African Unity (now African Union) African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I. L. M. 58 (1982) (27 June 1981). 
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discrimination,168 as well as equality before the law.169 the Banjul Charter also provides that it 
will ‘draw inspiration’ from other international human rights instruments.170 This seems to 
indicate that the provisions of the Banjul Charter should not be read in isolation, but rather as 
forming part of the larger international human rights law context instead. In other words, it 
appears that regional law, not unlike international law, provides that the Banjul Charter should 
be read and interpreted, in part at least, with the aid of other international human rights 
agreements such as CEDAW, the Torture Convention and the UDHR.  
There is a possibility, therefore, given the wide nature of the provisions, that although they 
are not explicitly mentioned throughout the regional agreement, the crimes of rape and torture 
may be interpreted to be included under the right to be protected against discrimination. To 
shed some light on this argument: the crime of torture may be committed by the perpetrator for 
purposes of discrimination; gender-based violence against women is a form of discrimination 
itself in that the crime is, essentially, violence inflicted upon women because they are 
women.171  
However, this link is incredibly indirect. Unless an incentive for rape and torture to be 
explicitly interpreted into the Banjul Charter becomes apparent, there is no reason to believe 
that the African Union would expressly provide that this is so.  
 
3.4.2. PROTOCOL TO THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ 
RIGHTS ON THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN AFRICA 
 
The Maputo Protocol was adopted in 2003 with the aim of expanding on women’s rights 
in Africa.172 It is often praised for being progressive and forward looking having been described 
as a ‘landmark instrument’ regarding women’s rights in Africa,173 the Maputo Protocol 
 
168 Article 2 of the Organisation of African Unity (now African Union) African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I. L. M. 58 (1982) (27 June 1981) 
169 Article 3 of the Organisation of African Unity (now African Union) African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I. L. M. 58 (1982) (27 June 1981). 
170 Article 60 of the Organisation of African Unity (now African Union) African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I. L. M. 58 (1982) (27 June 1981). 
171 L Gormley Women’s Access to Justice for Gender-Based Violence: A Practitioner’s Guide 12ed (2016) 91.  
172 F Banda ‘Blazing a Trail: the African Protocol on Women’s Rights Comes into Force’ (2006) 50 Journal of 
African Law 72 at 72. 
173 KSA Ebeku ‘A New Dawn for African Women – Prospects of Africa’s Protocol on Women’s Rights’ (2004) 16 
Sri Lanka Journal of International Law 83 at 85. 
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provides for the rights of gender equality and non-discrimination,174 as well as for women’s 
sexual and reproductive rights.175 It also provides for the protection of women from violence, 
including sexual violence, in both the public and private spheres.176 
The term ‘violence against women’ is described in the Maputo Protocol as being any act – 
or threat thereof – perpetrated, including the deprivation of ‘fundamental freedoms’, which 
causes harm to women in the public and private spheres.177 The crime of rape, or ‘unwanted or 
forced sex’ is encompassed in this definition as well.178 
Article 3 provides for the right to dignity; under this right, women are protected against 
sexual and verbal violence.179 Article 4 of the Maputo Protocol goes on to provide for the 
protection of the right to integrity; once again, the protection of women against sexual violence 
is accounted for, whether in private or in public life.180 The inclusion of the term ‘public or 
private life’ indicates the spheres in which women can experience violence: within the family, 
the community, or by the state.181 It may be argued that this means that liability for the crime 
of rape, though named as ‘unwanted or forced sex’ may be attributed to the state, whether the 
act was conducted by, instigated by, or consented to by a person of authority, or there was a 
failure to intervene and prevent the act from taking place in the private sphere.182 In essence, 
much like the Torture Convention and the General Recommendations of CEDAW, the Maputo 
Protocol seems to place obligations on the state to reduce and prevent acts of violence and 
discrimination against women.183 Additionally, and importantly, it should be noted that the 
 
174 Article 2 (1) of the African Union Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa (11 July 2003). 
175 Article 14 (1) of the African Union Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa (11 July 2003). 
176 Articles 3 (4) and 4 (2) of the African Union Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
on the Rights of Women in Africa (11 July 2003). 
177 Article 1 (j) of the African Union Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights 
of Women in Africa (11 July 2003). 
178 Article 4 (2) (a) of the African Union Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa (11 July 2003). 
179 Article 3 (4) of the African Union Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa (11 July 2003). 
180 Article 4 (2) of the African Union Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa (11 July 2003). 
181 Banda op cit (n 173) at 79. 
182 R Manjoo ‘State Responsibility to Act with Due Diligence in the Elimination of Violence Against Women’ 
(2013) 2 International Human Rights Law Review 240 at 252. 
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Maputo Protocol acknowledges the states’ responsibility to protect and prevent acts from 
violence from taking place by or against private individuals.184 
With regards to a connection with the crime of torture, the Maputo Protocol does not 
explicitly mention the latter, in any context. However, if, like the Banjul Charter, the Maputo 
Protocol was meant to have been read within the context of the agreements of the broader 
international sphere, there may be room for a connection between the two crimes to be read in.  
 
3.5. ‘WESTERN REGIONAL LAW’ 
 
As mentioned above, African and Western approaches to the law are different in ways that 
relate to values, culture, tradition and history, among other things. In reference to what has 
already been discussed, it appears that the international human rights agreements seem to draw 
from each other in terms of developing their jurisprudence. Such can be said for the African 
regional agreements, as were discussed above, in that they attempted to find something of a 
middle ground between African and Western culture and law.185 Such may also be said for 
certain aspects of the European Union and the Inter-American regional legal systems. These 
two systems will be further discussed below in order to determine whether similarities exist 
between them with regards to the crimes of rape and torture.  
 
3.5.1. ‘WESTERN’ LEGAL SYSTEMS AND TORTURE 
 
With regards to the crime of torture, the European Court of Human Rights appears to have 
been using the element of the degree of pain and suffering inflicted in order to differentiate 
whether the incident may be classified as an act of ill treatment, or as an act of torture (which 
connotates a heavier stigma than the former).186 The element of ‘pain and suffering’ is 
determined on a spectrum of factors including the ‘duration of the treatment, its physical or 
 
184 Manjoo op cit (n 182) at 252. 
185 Manjoo op cit (n 182) at 252; for example, the Maputo Protocol. 
186 S Fulton ‘Redress for Rape: Using International Jurisprudence on Rape as a form of Torture or other Ill-
Treatment’ Redress October 2013, available at https://redress.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/final-rape-as-
torture1.pdf, accessed on 5 December 2018 at page 12. 
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mental effects and, in some cases, the age, sex and state of health of the victim …’.187 From 
case law, it is rather clear that the European Court does not rule incidences as ‘torture’ 
lightly.188 However, they conceded that, due to the fact that the law is always susceptible to 
change, crimes that have been classified as something other than torture ‘could be classified 
differently in future’.189 
In relation to the ‘public official’ element of the definition of torture, the European Court 
of Human Rights has shown that they are willing to rule acts not inflicted by, or with the 
involvement of a public official as torture.190 However, this finding has not yet been made in 
cases involving rape, domestic violence, or forms of gender-based violence. The European 
Court has instead opted to classify these crimes as ‘ill treatment’ (which consists of ‘other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’, as referenced in the Torture 
Convention).191 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights appears to have a more traditional approach to 
classifying crimes as torture. This is illustrated by the majority in the case of Cottonfields, 
where the incident in question was not referred to as torture on the basis of there being no 
involvement of a public official.192 The minority in this matter expressed a criticism in relation 
to this providing that classifying an act as torture, or as other ill treatment, should be decided 
based upon the ‘severity of the suffering inflicted’.193 
Although the Inter-American and European systems may differ in approaches, they have 
both made a distinction between torture and ill treatment. This is in contrast to the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights which does not make a clear distinction between 
torture and other ill treatment.194 
 
 
187 ECHR, Selmouni v France (1998) Judgment of 14 April 1998 at para 100. 
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191 ECHR, Opuz v Turkey (2009) Judgment of 9 June 1998 at para 161. 
192 Concurring opinion of Judge Celia Media Quiroga, IACTHR, Cottonfields Case (2009) 16 November 2009, at 
para 9. 
193 Cottonfields Case supra (n 192) at para 3. 
194 N Rodley and M Pollard The Treatment of Prisoners under International Law (2011) 115; S Fulton ‘Redress 
for Rape: Using International Jurisprudence on Rape as a form of Torture or other Ill-Treatment’ REDRESS, 
October 2013, available at https://redress.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/final-rape-as-torture1.pdf, 
accessed on 19 June 2019 at 13.  
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3.5.2. ‘WESTERN’ LEGAL SYSTEMS AND RAPE AS TORTURE 
 
Though they may be scarce occurrences, the crime of rape has been classified as torture in 
a number of cases, as found by the regional bodies discussed above. In 1996, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights found that if the rape fulfilled three requirements as 
set out by the definition of ‘torture’ – ‘an intentional act [which resulted in pain and suffering 
being inflicted] on a person; committed with purpose; and committed by or at the instigation 
of a public official’ – it would be classified as torture.195 This matter concerned the rape of a 
school teacher conducted by members of the Peruvian Army.196 As the incidence had satisfied 
all of the abovementioned criteria, the Inter-American Commission found that the rape had 
constituted torture.197 
The same was found by the European Court of Human Rights,198 as well as the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights,199 in 1997 and 2000, respectively. The Committee 
against Torture followed suit soon after in 2006, where it was found that ‘sexual abuse by the 
police’ may be referred to as torture.200 
However, this is not to say that every rape or sexual assault committed by a state or public 
official will be classified as torture. On the contrary. This may be due to the fact that the 
elements of rape or sexual assault are so difficult to prove; therefore, the crime will likely have 
a higher threshold of proof required than other forms of torture or ill treatment. For example, 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, in the matter of Ortiz v Guatemala, found 
that the allegation of rape made by the complainant could not be substantiated by physical 
evidence.201 A few years thereafter, the European Court of Human Rights found that ‘the 
allegation [of rape] was made too late for it to be provide or disproved by medical evidence’.202 
Unfortunately, it may be said that the above is not unlike the attitude toward crimes of rape 
in South Africa.203 
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This Chapter has examined the international and regional laws regarding the crime of rape 
and torture applicable to South Africa by discussing provisions in the UDHR, international 
humanitarian law, the Torture Convention and CEDAW under international law; the Banjul 
Charter and Maputo protocol were examined under African regional law, as well as the 
European Union and Inter-American regional legal systems. It has been found that the 
provisions of the UDHR and Geneva Convention IV, likely due to having been drafted and 
adopted in the 1940s, almost immediately after the end of World War II, seem to focus on 
human rights in a more general and gender-neutral light. For this reason, the crime of rape and 
the issue of violence against women was not heavily elaborated on, resulting in the need for 
women’s rights to be interpreted and read into these provisions at a later stage. The right to be 
protected against acts of torture (and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment), however, has been incorporated into a number of international human rights 
agreements; this right primarily stems from Article 5 of the UDHR. 
Further, this Chapter has found that, with regards to the Torture Convention, there is no 
direct link mentioned between the crimes of rape and torture. This link was only explicitly 
recognised in international case law, as well as in General Comment 2, a non-binding document 
that informs provisions included in the Torture Convention, both of which emerged years after 
the adoption of the Torture Convention in 1984. This Chapter has also found that, importantly, 
the Torture Convention places an obligation on the state, not only to prohibit and prevent acts 
of torture from taking place (specifically in terms of the definition requiring the involvement 
of a public official), but it also has an obligation to intervene in acts of harm that take place 
between private persons. 
CEDAW, while known as the ‘international bill of rights for women’, failed to address the 
issue of violence against women. As a result, this matter was addressed through a number of 
General Recommendations, in which rape and torture may be interpreted to be indirectly linked 
to one another. Eventually, under General Recommendation 35 in 2017, the CEDAW 
Committee explicitly recognised that the crime of rape may constitute a form of torture under 
certain circumstances. Additionally, it should also be noted that CEDAW, like the Torture 
Convention, places an obligation on states to prevent and prohibit acts of gender-based violence 
against private individuals.  
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In terms of African Regional Law, this Chapter has found that the Banjul Charter, much 
like the UDHR, contains mostly gender-neutral provisions, the only mention of women falling 
under the protection of women from discrimination. The Maputo Protocol expanded on 
women’s rights and the need for women to be protected from all forms of violence, including 
sexual violence. Here, too, states have an obligation to protect private individuals from harm 
and gender-based violence against women. However, with regards to a connection between 
rape and torture, apart from tasking states with considering other international human rights 
instruments and provisions with regards to women’s rights. Both of these regional instruments 
fail to mention the crime of torture or link it with the crime of rape. 
The ‘Western’ regional laws (namely the European Union and the Inter-American legal 
systems) were considered. This Chapter found that these two legal systems have made a 
distinction between ‘torture’ and ‘other ill treatment’; this is in comparison to African regional 
law, in which this distinction has not been made. Furthermore, it has been found that it is 
possible for the crime of rape to constitute torture in the international sphere. However, the 
regional bodies and courts are reluctant in this regard due to the higher threshold of proof 
required to show that there has been a rape. It may be argued that this is part of the issue 
concerning law enforcement and not believing the allegation of rape from the victim. 
Finally, it should be noted that the Committee against Torture, the CEDAW Committee, as 
well as the African regional written laws (to an extent) have brought up and recognise that 
states should bear a responsibility towards actively preventing these crimes of rape and other 
sexual harassment from taking place among private individuals. This is significant in that it 
implies that where states do not actively make efforts and take positive steps in preventing and 
stopping the crime of rape from taking place in the private sphere, among private individuals, 













Law surrounding women’s human rights in South Africa has developed a great amount, 
especially since the adoption of the South African Constitution in 1996.204 However, despite 
the tremendous legal developments, it can be said that the South African reality does not always 
reflect the state’s on-paper legislation.  
This Chapter will discuss current South African law in relation to the protection of women 
from acts of rape and torture. It will explore whether South Africa is under a legal obligation 
to reduce and prevent the amount of rapes that take place in the country. The pieces of 
legislation that will be considered include the Constitution, the Torture Act, the Sexual 
Offences Act and the Domestic Violence Act. This Chapter will discuss whether rape may be 
considered as a form of torture in South Africa. Finally, this Chapter will discuss whether the 
state of South Africa, through its law and the implementation of such law, is in violation of its 
obligations under international treaties. 
 
4.2.THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1996 
 
The Constitution – the supreme and overarching law of South Africa – including its Bill of 
Rights, is often described as one of the ‘most progressive and far reaching domestic human 
rights documents’ in the world.205 The rights in the Bill of Rights are interconnected; wen 
individual provisions are being interpreted, they should not be read in isolation, but rather as 
relating to other rights of the Constitution as well.206 This is not dissimilar to the way in which 
international agreements may be seen as interconnected.  
The Bill of Rights is largely gender neutral and therefore, apart, perhaps, from the right to 
reproductive health care,207 there is no specific mention of the protection of women’s rights in 
 
204 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
205 P de Vos ‘Introduction to South Africa’s 1996 Bill of Rights’ (1997) 15 Netherlands Quarterly of Human 
Rights 225 at 225. 
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Chapter 2 of the Constitution. As such, the protection of women against violence, rape and 
torture are encompassed in the rights to equality and non-discrimination,208 human dignity,209 
and freedom,210 among others.211 These provisions are arguably connected with most rights 
throughout the Constitution.  
Section 9 of the Constitution provides that all persons are equal before the law and that 
everyone should be protected by it.212 Section 9 (3) goes on to provide that no person should 
be unfairly discriminated against on a number of grounds, including gender.213 Further, Section 
9 is given expression by the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination 
Act; Section 8 of this Act specifically provides for the protection of women from gender-based 
violence.214 
As mentioned above, both CEDAW and DEVAW recognise gender-based violence against 
women, including rape, as constituting a form of gender discrimination.215 This was reiterated 
by the Constitutional Court in the case of Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security;216 the 
court went further to provide that the state has a duty to prevent gender-based violence against 
women in both international and domestic law.217 In recognising the link between 
discrimination and rape – along with other forms of gender-based violence against women – it 
becomes clearer as to how women’s rights should be protected, not only by South African 
legislation, but by the state as well.  
Section 10 of the Constitution provides that all persons have the right to respect and 
protection of their human dignity.218 Human dignity has been described as the ‘incalculable’ 
and ‘intrinsic worth’ of a person with the right to be treated with ‘respect and concern’.219 In 
essence, to infringe on a persons’ human dignity would be to subject them to ‘abusive, 
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degrading, humiliating or demeaning’ conduct,220 a description that matches the crime of rape. 
in the matter concerning S v Chapman, the Supreme Court of Appeal provided that all women 
are entitled to the right to dignity, and that the crime of rape constitutes a severe invasion of 
that right.221 The court went on to provide that the quality and enjoyment of women’s lives is 
severely diminished by acts of gender-based violence against women.222  
Section 12 of the Constitution provides that ‘everyone has the right to freedom and security 
of the person’.223 Included in ‘freedom and security’ are the rights to be protected from violence 
‘from either public or private sources’,224 torture,225 and inhuman or cruel treatment.226 Section 
12 further provides for the right to psychological and bodily integrity – the right of a person to 
have control over their body.227 In the context of the crime of rape, during which the victim 
does not always have sufficient physical control over her body, Section 12 is incredibly 
important. 
It may be argued that the prohibitions listed in Section 12 of the Constitution are wide 
enough that sexual violence and rape may be included within their scope. This is provided for 
by the Supreme Court of Appeal in the case concerning Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and 
Security (Women’s Legal Centre Trust as Amicus Curiae).228 Here, the court found that the 
crimes of rape and sexual assault on women constitutes an infringement of the right to freedom 
and security of the person and that the state is responsible for taking positive steps in preventing 
such crimes.229 The responsibility that the court places on the state in this matter with regards 
to the prevention of violence against women should be noted; by providing that the state has 
the above obligation, the court recognises the importance of international law and its 
applicability in South African domestic law.  
Section 39 (1) (b) of the Constitution, which provides that an interpretation of the Bill of 
Rights should take international law into consideration, further substantiates this view.230 
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Additionally, Section 205 (3) of the Constitution specifically provides that the police service 
(which forms part of the state) have an obligation to ‘… prevent … protect and secure the 
inhabitants of the Republic and their property, and to uphold and enforce the law’.231 Reading 
these two provisions together, along with certain provisions of international legal agreements 
such as DEVAW, the CEDAW, or General Comment 2, it may be said that the South African 
state has a clear obligation to take positive steps in attempting to decrease and prevent rape, as 
well as other sexual assaults, altogether.232 
It therefore may be argued that although there appears to be some reluctance on the part of 
the state to involve themselves in private matters of the individual citizen, the state has an 
obligation, based not only in international law, but in case law and the Constitution itself, to do 
just that; important developments have been made in terms of international law which aid in 
preventing any impediments to the protection of women, or at least her rights, from the crime 
of rape.233 It may therefore, be said that not only does the state have an obligation to investigate 
and punish crimes that have already taken place and that have been reported, but they have a 
responsibility to the inhabitants of South Africa to reduce and prevent rape and other forms of 
sexual violence from taking place among private citizens.  
 
4.3.PROMINENT LEGISLATION PROTECTING AGAINST SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE: CRIMINAL LAW (SEXUAL OFFENCES AND RELATED 
MATTERS) AMENDMENT ACT 32 OF 2007 AND THE DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE ACT 116 OF 1998 
 
Possibly two of the more prominent expression of laws pertaining to the protection of 
women from sexual violence are the Sexual Offences Act,234 and the Domestic Violence Act.235 
These Acts were adopted in response to the fact that South African law – both in statutes and 
under the common law – of the time did not adequately address or provide for the effective 
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implementation of the laws relating to criminal sexual offences, such as rape.236 As addressed 
above, the definition of rape has since been broadened and transformed by the Sexual Offences 
Act into what it is known as today. These two Acts are possibly some of the earlier examples 
of the state attempting to take steps in reducing violence against women.  
The Domestic Violence Act provides for the protection of women against domestic 
violence, including sexual violence of which the crime of rape constitutes a form;237 while this 
Act does not expressly stipulate that domestic violence is illegal, it provides that victims are 
entitled to apply for and obtain protection orders from the South African Police Service against 
their perpetrators,238 whether that may be a stranger, or their own spouse. Upon breach of said 
protection order, a warrant of arrest may be issued against the perpetrator.239 The Domestic 
Violence Act appears to place a significant responsibility upon the SAPS,240 and by extension, 
the state, in assisting with the protection of women from domestic violence. The Sexual 
Offences Act provides a comprehensive ‘framework for the provision of adequate and effective 
protection’ to victims and survivors of sexual offences.241 
These two pieces of legislation give rise to rights in the Constitution, such as equality, 
dignity and freedom.242 They also acknowledge the obligations of South Africa under certain 
international agreements, such as CEDAW, to protect women from and eventually eliminate 
all forms of gender-based violence against women.243 This acknowledgment gives effect to 
those provisions of the Constitution which provide that, at least to some extent, South African 
law cannot be considered in isolation.  
One of the most important mandates provided by CEDAW’s General Recommendation 35 
is that states have a responsibility placed upon them with regards to drafting legislation and 
implementing measures that will lessen and eventually eliminate all forms of discrimination 
against women.244 There is no denying that the Sexual Offences Act and the Domestic Violence 
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Act, throughout their various provisions, provide reasonable legal mechanisms through which 
rape and other sexual offences can be reported and punished; the increase in the amount of 
rapes reported after the definition was changed in 2007 proves that the Sexual Offences Act 
was, in a way, a success.245 However, it should be noted that both Acts only address the steps 
to be taken after the incident has already occurred. It may be argued that the Domestic Violence 
Act contributes to the prevention of repeat sexual offences with regards to its provisions to do 
with protection orders.246 Nevertheless, even then, the Act specifies a requirement that in order 
for a protection order to be issued by the court, there must be prima facie evidence that an act 
of domestic violence is being or has been committed.247 This is in stark contrast with the 
Torture Act in which it is provided that the state bears the responsibility of promoting 
awareness regarding the prohibition of torture through information and education 
campaigns.248 It may be argued that not including the importance of awareness surrounding the 
crime of rape and other sexual offences constitutes a notable oversight on the part of the 
legislators. 
Furthermore, regardless of the progression and broadening of the crime of rape – the 
developments of which, despite the above criticism, have certainly been significant in terms of 
what it once was – based on the above, it is clear that are still gaps in some of the practical 
elements as well as the implementation of the Sexual Offences Act and the Domestic Violence 
Act. This is partly due to the attitude that the members of the SAPS have toward accusations 
of rape being reported.249 The crime of rape or any other sexual violence, especially when 
committed as a form of domestic violence is often perceived as a private matter; the public 
sphere of the state, including the police, is often hesitant to involve itself in private matters 
concerning individuals.250 Due to this attitude on the part of the police, victims tend to feel 
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reluctant to report incidences of rape, or withdraw their matters, on account of them thinking 
that the police (and the legal system in general) will not believe them.251 
 
4.4.PREVENTION OF COMBATING AND TORTURE OF PERSONS ACT 13 OF 
2013 
 
The Torture Act was adopted in 2013 in order to give effect to Section 12 (1) (d) of the 
Constitution, as well as to integrate the Torture Convention provisions into South African 
law.252 The Torture Convention was signed by South Africa in 1993, to be ratified later in 1998, 
two years after the Constitution came into effect.253 From this time, the Torture Convention 
was considered as applicable law in South Africa. The Bill bearing the same title as the Torture 
Act was published in the Government Gazette in the year 2012, and finally came into effect as 
an official Act one year later, approximately 29 years after the Torture Convention came into 
force in the international sphere.254 Between the time the Torture Convention was ratified, and 
the Torture Act became applicable, South Africa took few measures to give effect to its 
obligations under the former, but for criminalising ‘common assault’ or ‘assault with intent to 
commit grievous bodily harm’ under the common law.255 
With reference to the above, the laws governing the crime of torture have come a lot farther 
than what it was addressed as under the South African common law. Not only does the Torture 
Act acknowledge its obligations under international law,256 but it also incorporates key human 
rights as contemplated in the Constitution; most notably, the rights to equality, dignity and 
freedom.257 Additionally, as the definition of torture in the Torture Act and Torture Convention 
bear such resemblance, it can be argued that there is a possibility of the due diligence argument 
to be applied in South African law as well.  
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Further, like the Sexual Offences Act and the Domestic Violence Act, the Torture Act also 
places an obligation on the state, namely, that the state bears the responsibility to promote 
awareness regarding the prohibition of torture.258 The state is tasked with promoting awareness 
through education and information campaigns;259 as well as with properly training public 
officials to deal with complaints of torture and preventing torture from taking place.260 This is 
incredibly important as not many are truly aware of what the legal definition of ‘torture’ is and 
that it involves the participation of a ‘public official’. As such, many people are not aware that 
one of the most common forms of torture in South Africa is police brutality.  
As mentioned above, the Torture Act, like the Torture Convention, defines ‘torture’ as ‘any 
act by which severe pain or suffering … physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a 
person … for any reason based on discrimination of any kind’.261 Keeping this in mind, the 
Constitutional right to equality provides that no one may be discriminated against on a number 
of grounds, including that of gender.262 
It is necessary to recognise that there is somewhat of a link that exists between rape and 
torture in South African law. Put simply, if an act of gender-based violence (including rape) is 
conducted on the basis of discrimination, and an act of torture may be conducted for a reason 
based on discrimination, then the crime of rape may constitute an act of torture, provided that 
the necessary requirements of each crime are met. It is necessary to recognise the overlap and 
take note of the potential for legal development in these areas of law.  
 
4.5.RAPE AS TORTURE IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
 
From the above discussion of the Sexual Offences Act, the Domestic Violence Act and the 
Torture Act, it may be said that the crime of rape and other sexual offences not considered as 
a direct form of torture in South Africa. As it is listed under Section 5 of the Torture Act, the 
crime of rape appears to be an aggravating circumstance to be considered in deciding whether 
an act was, in fact, torture, rather than the subject matter of the crime of torture itself.263 From 
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this, a deduction can be made that rape and other sexual offences are seen as something 
somewhat lesser than torture, or rather, as the European Union and Inter-American legal 
systems have classified it, another form of ill treatment.264 
The above is substantiated by South African case law including the matters of K v Minister 
of Safety and Security,265 and F v Minister of Safety and Security.266 In both of these matters, 
women had been raped;267 the former, by an on-duty police officer and the latter, by an off-
duty police officer driving in an unmarked police vehicle.268 In both instances, the court found 
the perpetrators guilty of rape and found further, that there was a sufficient link to the SAPS to 
warrant the matter being brought against the Minister of Safety and Security (an actor of the 
state).269 
Based solely off of the facts of the matters, both cases involved severe pain and suffering 
in the form of physical and (potentially) mental arm being inflicted on the victims for reasons 
based on gender discrimination. Furthermore, both matters involved the unlawful act being 
carried out by a public official who was, in accordance with the courts’ findings, acting in an 
official capacity.270 For all intents and purposes, the facts of both matters fit the requirements, 
not only of rape, but for torture as well. However, whether it is due to the court having been 
content that the sanctions that would be imposed upon the accused were satisfactory, or whether 
it is due to the crime of torture being considered, primarily, as one that takes place in the context 
of conflict and police brutality, the courts did not rule as such.  
Does this mean that rape cannot be considered as a form of torture in South Africa? On the 
contrary. From what has been discussed in this paper until this point, the following is known 
to be true: first, international law (the Torture Convention and CEDAW along with its General 
Recommendations) all provide that there is an obligation upon states to protect private 
individuals by practicing due diligence and taking positive steps in reducing and preventing 
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private individuals from incurring harm, whether inflicted by a public official or by another 
private individual.271 Secondly, South African domestic law (the Sexual Offences Act, the 
Domestic Violence Act and the Torture Act) provides for the same thing – the state bears an 
obligation to take steps, to the best of their ability and in accordance with protecting 
Constitutional rights as well as upholding the international law, to prevent anyone from 
suffering harm, whether that harm may be in the form of rape or torture.272 Thirdly, although 
it is never an explicit one, there does exist a link between the crimes of rape and torture – they 
are both given effect to and protected against by Section 12 of the Constitution.273  
The two crimes are also protected against by the provisions in the Constitution which deal 
with the importance of international law. Through these provisions, international are applicable 
in South Africa. First, there is Section 39 (1) (b) which, as above, provides international law 
must be considered when interpreting domestic laws; the interpretation of domestic laws should 
not be in contravention of international law agreements.274 Secondly, there is Section 231 
which provides that international law becomes binding on the state of South Africa when it has 
been signed, ratified and transformed into domestic legislation;275 international treaties that 
meet these requirements can be directly applied in South African law.276 To put it simply, if 
international law is directly applicable in South Africa, it can be argued that rape may be 
considered as a form of torture in South Africa, despite the domestic legislation not having 
linked the two directly.  
From the moment all the above requirements are met, the international law is directly 
applicable in South Africa.277 This means that the Torture Convention and CEDAW, along 
with other international human rights agreements which have been signed, ratified and 
transformed into domestic legislation by South Africa are considered to be as directly 
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applicable law.278 The obligations imposed on the state by these international agreements, such 
as ensuring the protection of private individuals and taking positive steps to preventing harm, 
are also applicable and binding upon South Africa.  
In terms of CEDAW, Article 16 of General Recommendation 35 provides that gender-
based violence against women ‘may amount to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
in certain circumstances’ in contexts, including those of ‘rape, domestic violence or harmful 
practices, among others’.279 As stated above, this provision of General Recommendation 35 
makes no mention of the public official requirement that the definition of torture does. This 
may be interpreted to mean that South Africa, as a party to the international agreement has an 
obligation to protect private individuals from being subject to the crime of rape, which may be 
considered as a form of torture, and take positive steps in an effort to reduce and eventually 
stop rapes from taking place altogether. 
In terms of the Torture Convention, based off of case law and General Comment 2, it can 
be said that the international agreement has been interpreted and expanded upon, though 
perhaps not officially amended, to include the crime of rape as a form of torture.280 While the 
crime of torture is usually thought of as taking place during a time of conflict and should 
include the involvement of a public official, the Torture Convention also provides for abuses 
that have been conducted by private persons.281 The definition of torture in Article 1, as read 
in by the Committee Against Torture in the case of Hajrizi Dzemajl, provides that states have 
a responsibility to protect private individuals and should be held liable where it has failed to 
intervene in harmful acts being conducted by non-state actors.282 This may be interpreted to 
mean that South Africa should be held liable in situations where they have not taken reasonable 
and positive steps in an attempt to prevent the crime of rape as a form of torture.  
It is understandable that, in a country like South Africa, it is not necessarily realistic to 
believe that the state can or will prevent every instance of rape that takes place. This may be 
due to a number of factors including an unwillingness on the part of the victim to report the 
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crime, poor implementation of South African laws pertaining to rape, the reluctance on the part 
of the state to become involved in the matters of private individuals, or perhaps, inadequate 
laws, among many other reasons.283 
The Torture Convention and CEDAW both cite that states must take positive steps in 
reducing the number of incidences that take place within their country. It can be argued that 
South Africa, a new and still-developing democracy, has made a positive step in drafting the 
legislation that protects against the crimes of rape and torture. However, the counter-argument 
can also be made that, apart from drafting the legislation, the state has not taken many other 
significant positive steps in preventing the crimes.  
In addition, it can be said that the existing legislation, as mentioned above, certainly has 
room for improvement; for example, most of the laws pertaining to protection against rape and 
torture, instead of being preventative, are remedial.284 The legislation and the bodies attempting 
to implement the ‘preventative’ mechanisms make provision for the punishments that may be 
handed down after the incident has taken place, should the relevant requirements be met;285 in 
the instance of rape, these requirements are often difficult for the victim to meet. Preventative 
measures are not dealt with in either the Sexual Offences Act or the Domestic Violence Act. 
The only preventative measure stipulated in the Torture Act is that of promoting general 
awareness about torture;286 even then the government has not done a good job of engaging with 
the public regarding the wrongs that are done to them and what may be classified as torture.287 
Therefore, it can be argued that the South African legislation does not properly and thoroughly 
encompass what is envisioned in the international law agreements; based on the above, it can 
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be said that the state has not altered the legislation sufficiently over time so that it may reflect 
and aid the current-day reality. 
Furthermore, it may be argued that due to the sheer number of criminal incidences, ranging 
anywhere between petty theft to murder, that are reported to the police on a daily basis plays a 
role in how the police respond to and approach reports of rape;288 due to the other issues that 
the SAPS address, their concern may only be focussed on reports of ‘real rape’. Smythe 
suggests that this notion of ‘real rape’ amounts to the ‘extent of violence and injury’ that 
accompanied the sexual assault.289 In other words, if the harm done to the victim is severe 
enough, they will give it more importance than if an unscathed woman reports a rape. This kind 
of attitude towards rape reports further discourages women to come forward and lay a charge 
as women ‘do not believe the police will believe them’.290 As such, any efforts made by the 
legislation to put processes in place which would prevent further harm, are hindered.  
Essentially, both with regards to the less than satisfactory legislation and the poor 
implementation thereof by the police, as well as the victims’ attitude toward and opinion of the 
legal system, it can be said that the Torture Convention and CEDAW are not properly given 
effect to in South Africa. The state has not engaged in providing significant positive steps to 
combat and prevent sexual assault in South Africa, despite having committed to the 
international agreements a number of years ago. It is therefore put forward that the South 
African state does not thoroughly and properly comply with or meet its international 




This Chapter has explored the link between the crimes of rape and torture in South Africa 
through considering relevant pieces of South African legislation and case law. It has further 
discussed whether South Africa fulfils its obligations under the Torture Convention and 
CEDAW sufficiently or not.  
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This Chapter has found, first, that the Constitution places an obligation on the state to 
protect the rights of all persons, whether they be public or private actors. This obligation 
extends to South African domestic law in the Sexual Offences Act, the Domestic Violence Act 
and the Torture Act, in that they all place some kind of obligation on the state to uphold the 
Constitution. Additionally, all three Acts place a responsibility on the state to uphold and give 
effect to the international agreements of CEDAW and the Torture Convention, respectively.  
 This Chapter found that, through the application of international law in that the 
international agreements have been signed, ratified, and transformed into domestic law, they 
are directly applicable in South African law where the domestic law fails to meet the 
international law legislation. In this instance, due to the application of international law, rape 
may be considered as a form of torture under South African law, as it is in international law.  
This Chapter has further found that due to a number of issues surrounding poor legislation, 
a failure to transform South African law with international law and over time, as well as the 
poor implementation of said legislation, South Africa does not appear to live up to the legal 
responsibilities placed upon it by the international agreements mentioned above. 
South African domestic legislation does not provide for preventative measures, but rather 
for remedial ones that only come into effect after the incident of rape has taken place. Further, 
based solely off of the sheer amount of rapes that have been reported in the past year, it is clear 
that public officials, and the state at large, has not practiced due diligence in an effort to reduce 
and prevent acts of rape, which may be considered as a form of torture, from taking place. As 
such, it is concluded that South Africa fails in its international obligations under CEDAW and 









5. CHAPTER 5 
In terms of this research paper, the following conclusions have been reached: 
First, the current international, regional and domestic laws pertaining to the crimes of rape 
and torture in South Africa amount to what can be described as extensive and encompassing. 
The South African legal definitions of both crimes are not only broad so as to be open to 
interpretation, but they also closely reflect the international definitions of each crime.  
Second, with regards to the link between rape and torture in international law, the only two 
documents in which the connection was explicitly recognised were General Comment 2 – 
which informs the Torture Convention – and General Recommendation 35 – which is 
supplementary to CEDAW. This link is supplemented through a number of judgments 
stemming from international and regional courts and tribunals which have found rape to be a 
form of torture in certain instances. 
Beyond this, it was found that under both CEDAW and the Torture Convention, states bear 
a responsibility to protect private individuals from harm caused not only by public officials, 
but by non-state and private actors as well. CEDAW’s General Recommendation 35 provides 
for this in Article 16, whereas the Torture Convention requires a doctrine of due diligence to 
be read into its definition.  
Third, with regards to the link between rape and torture in South African law, perhaps the 
primary source would be the Constitution, considering that both crimes are protected against 
under Section 12. Further, the Constitution, much like the international law agreements 
discussed above, provides that the state has a responsibility to protect all persons and their 
rights (this extends to the South African domestic law discussed, above). The Constitution also 
stipulates that the state must uphold relevant and applicable international agreements, such as 
the Torture Convention and CEDAW. 
The link between rape and torture is expanded upon when international law is directly 
applied to South African law after all the relevant requirements have been met. As such, based 
off of the direct application of CEDAW and the Torture Convention, rape may be considered 
as a form of torture in South Africa.  
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With regards as to whether South Africa fulfils its legal responsibilities under the 
international law discussed with regards to rape as a form of torture being conducted by private 
individuals, it may be said that the domestic legislation and surrounding issues leave much to 
be desired. South Africa’s remedial, not preventative, measures as set out in domestic 
legislation do not comply with the international law obligation to practice due diligence and 
take positive steps in reducing and preventing the crime of rape. Resultantly, it may be said 
that the state of South Africa does not satisfactorily fulfil is obligations under the Torture 
Convention and CEDAW in matters concerning rape, which may amount to a form of torture. 
Realistically, it is put forward that the South African legal systems in place, ranging from 
the forms that need to be filled out at the SAPS, to recounting the incident in court, are simply 
inadequate to deal with the vast amount of rapes that take place on a daily basis, whether violent 
and bloody or not. Although this is a grim truth, it should not prevent or discourage those who 
are capable of making a difference from attempting to decrease the amount of rapes that the 
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